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Abstract 
In this article, we consider the question of how professionalized the cantonal 
parliamentarians are and which factors are related to this professionalization. By definition, 
Swiss parliamentarians exert an occupation in parallel to their mandate. We argue that 
parliamentarians who spend more time for their mandate have more resources to do so and, 
more importantly, intend to pursue a political career. In doing so, we analyze data gathered 
from a survey that was conducted among all Swiss cantonal parliaments in 2014. Our multi-
level analysis shows that parliamentarians who run for office at the national level spend 
significantly more time for their parliamentary mandate than their colleagues. This effect 
decreases with the parliamentarians’ age. This finding could be relevant in order to 
understand the career paths of Swiss parliamentarians. In addition, the study contributes to 
the discussion of the future development of the militia system in Switzerland. 
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1 Introduction 
Parliaments belong to the most elementary institutions of contemporary democracies. They 
are assigned to represent the electorate, to oversee the government, and to make policies 
(Blondel 1973; Loewenberg et al. 2002; Martin et al. 2014; Olson and Mezey 1991; Pitkin 1967). 
Since the activities of most states have increased over time, parliaments face the challenge to 
be confronted with a higher workload. As a consequence, almost all national parliaments 
have professionalized in the last decades (Moncrief 1994; Squire 2007; Squire and Moncrief 
2015).  
The Swiss political system is an exception. The Federal Assembly is still seen as a non-
professional parliament. This so-called militia system has recently been widely debated in 
the media and amongst political scientists (Müller 2015; Pilotti et al. 2010; Pilotti 2015). 
Several studies have investigated the professionalization of the parliaments showing that the 
members of parliament (MPs) in the Federal Assembly spend increasingly more time for 
their parliamentary mandate (Bütikofer 2014; Hug et al. 2008; Kerr 1981; Krüger et al. 2001; 
Riklin and Möckli 1991; Wiesli and Linder 2000; Z’graggen 2009).  
In contrast to the development at the national level, most cantonal parliaments still rely on 
part-time parliamentary mandates and most MPs have a regular occupation next to their 
parliamentary obligation. Although it is often assumed that cantonal MPs are less 
professionalized than their colleagues at the federal level, no study has so far systematically 
investigated the professionalization at the cantonal level. However legislative 
professionalization has an important impact on the function of the parliament. Several 
studies from the American states show that the level of professionalization has a high 
influence on how the parliament works, e.g. power of legislative leaders and re-election 
strategies (Berry et al. 2000; Clucas 2007; Fiorina 1999; Lax and Phillips 2012). 
In this article, we investigate the question of how professionalized the members of the 
cantonal parliaments are and which factors are related to this professionalization. For this 
purpose, we consider the amount of time MPs spend exercising their mandate as an 
indicator of the degree of professionalization at the individual level. We state that the more 
time an MP dedicates to the parliamentary mandate, the higher is the level of the MP’s 
professionalization. Based on previous research, we argue that MPs with an occupational 
background that gives them sufficient financial and time resources spend more time for their 
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parliamentary mandate. As political experience in local and regional offices is seen as an 
important stepping-stone to enter a legislative office at the national level (Stolz 2003; Wiesli 
1999), we expect that MPs who run for office at the national parliament tend to be more 
professionalized, since they want to pursue a political career. Indeed, we expect that 
cantonal particularities also influence the degree of professionalization of the members of 
cantonal legislatives. For this reason, we analyze the impact of the linguistic region, the size 
of the cantonal parliament and the allowances of cantonal MPs on their degree of 
professionalization.  
Empirically, the arguments are analyzed with a survey that was conducted among Swiss 
MPs (Eberli et al. 2014). Among other topics, MPs were asked about their parliamentary 
work. Our results show that the amount of time spent does not only vary across the MPs, but 
also between the cantons. The findings suggest that MPs who run for office at the national 
level spend more time for their parliamentary mandate. This is an important result taking 
into account that the share of Swiss national MPs who served in a cantonal legislative before 
entering the national parliament is very high compared to other countries (Bailer 2016; Stolz 
2003; Wiesli 1999) and the fact that the Swiss Federal Assembly is characterized by an 
ongoing process of professionalization. Moreover, our article makes a substantial 
contribution to the legislative studies by providing a comprehensive analysis for legislative 
professionalization.  
The article is structured as follows: Section 2 defines the concept of legislative 
professionalization and introduces the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and methods, 
while section 4 illustrates the distribution of legislative professionalization across the Swiss 
cantons and presents the results of the empirical analysis. Section 5 discusses the results and 
section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Legislative Professionalization 
Max Weber’s essay “Politics as a Vocation”, first published in 1919, launched the debate 
about politicians and how political mandates should be conducted. In general, the term 
professionalization describes a transformation process of a specific activity into a profession 
that respects formal norms and rules of behavior. In the sphere of politics, 
professionalization is seen as the change from a voluntary engagement to a paid, full-time 
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activity, done by elected representatives. This transformation process has consequences not 
only for the persons holding a political office, but also for the institutions and the political 
system in its entirety. Thus, it is usual in the political science literature to distinguish 
between different facets of the process of political professionalization (Squire 1992; Borchert 
2003; Z’graggen 2009). Borchert (2003), for example, notes that professionalization can take 
place at four different levels: those of individuals, offices, institutions, and the political 
system as such. At the individual level stands the emergence of professional politicians as a 
new profession. In this context, some authors have for instance analyzed which individual-
level characteristics are more likely to be encountered among professional politicians 
(Borchert and Golsch 1995). The professionalization of political offices is linked with the 
amount of resources associated with them, in the form of salary and staff, for example. This 
is distinct from institutional professionalization, which denotes a similar process at the level 
of the parliament itself. Finally, system-level professionalization refers to the degree to which 
various political offices and institutions, at different levels, have gone through such a 
process.  
Being a politician became a regular profession during the last century. Politicians became 
increasingly dependent on their mandates, as they did not follow other career paths outside 
of the political sphere. A consequence is that politicians in professionalized parliaments tend 
to be younger, since they join their party earlier and focus strongly on a career in politics. 
These MPs also stay longer in office, have a higher degree of education, and the frequency of 
voluntary demission is decreasing over time (Z’graggen 2009). In highly professionalized 
institutions, professional politicians follow a typical career path, which is quite similar 
between different countries and political systems (Stolz 2003). As a consequence, politicians 
have to possess specific skills that enable them to be successful in their political activity – as 
other professionals in the private or public sector. Dahl and Lindblom (1953) have early 
suggested bargaining, negotiation, and the ability to compromise as the most important 
political skills for a successful career in politics.  
Starting in the 1970s, political scientists in Switzerland have developed a growing interest for 
the professionalization of national MPs. Kerr (1981) conducted a first survey of all members 
of the Federal Assembly during the 39th legislative period (from 1971 to 1975). Among many 
other questions, the research team was interested in knowing how much of their working 
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time politicians were dedicating to their parliamentary mandate. Surprisingly, only a 
minority of twenty-five percent of the MPs could be considered as traditional militia 
politicians (Kerr 1981). Over time, several following surveys confirmed those findings (Riklin 
and Möckli 1991; Wiesli and Linder 2000: Krüger et al. 2001; Hug et al. 2008): The number of 
full-time politicians in the Federal Assembly increased over time. These changes had 
consequences at the organizational level of the Swiss Federal Assembly. The institutions 
went through several reforms, which also contributed to an increased level of 
professionalization of both the parliament (Lüthi 1997) and the parliamentary party groups 
(Bailer and Bütikofer 2015).  
The ideal of a militia parliament is still strongly anchored in Swiss society. It is not surprising 
that several attempts to reform and professionalize the parliament at the national level were 
declined in the past, with the argument that the militia system guarantees closer links 
between representatives and the population. Nevertheless, all empirical studies show that 
MPs with full-time careers outside of politics have become more and more rare at the 
national level and the number of Swiss MPs who devote a significant part of their working 
time to politics is increasing. A growing number of MPs dedicate most of their time to 
politics, or work only for associations, trade unions or in other organizations related to 
politics (Oesch 2006). But only few MPs actually consider themselves to be full-time 
politicians. Many MPs still avoid labeling themselves as professional politicians, for instance 
in their biographical information on the website of the Swiss Parliament (e.g. swissinfo 2014). 
The argument is that MPs want to keep a strong link to the citizens and avoid becoming 
isolated from the preferences and problems of their constituencies. Even members of the 
Council of States who dedicate at least 60 to 70 per cent of their working hours to politics 
(see, e.g., Hug et al. 2008), did not consider themselves to be fully professional politicians. 
In our analysis, we focus on the members of cantonal parliaments. Little is known about 
cantonal legislators in Switzerland. It is only in recent years that researchers started to focus 
on the case of cantonal legislators1 (e.g. Heinsohn and Freitag 2012; Eberli et al. 2014; 
Bütikofer and Widmer 2015; Feh Widmer 2015; Feh Widmer and Vatter 2015; Bundi 2016). 
                                                            
1 Feh Widmer (2015) dealt with parliamentary fluctuations in cantonal legislatives; Bundi (2016) and Eberli et al. 
(2014) investigated evaluation demand and use by legislators, while Bütikofer and Widmer (2015) studied the 
voting behavior of members of a subnational parliament. 
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But as far as we know, almost all cantonal legislators can still be considered as part-time 
politicians. Literally, they keep alive the ideal of the Swiss militia parliament. 
 
Explaining Professionalization in the Swiss Subnational Legislatives 
Our intention is to analyze the situation of the legislative professionalization in all the 
cantonal legislatures. For this purpose, we draw on the literature on professionalization and 
research on Swiss parliaments in order to identify factors that are related to the legislative 
professionalization. We then test these factors with empirical data – to our best knowledge – 
for the first time. As shown before, we define professionalization as the amount of time a MP 
dedicates to his or her mandate. The amount of time dedicated to the parliamentary work is 
a direct indicator to measure one’s involvement with legislative work. The more working 
time a MP invests into parliamentary sessions, committee meetings and preparative work, 
the less time he or she has for pursuing other career paths. Consequently, a large share of 
working time dedicated to politics implies that the parliamentary mandate can be seen as a 
full-time job. Therefore, the amount of working time dedicated to the parliamentary mandate 
seems to be a convincing indicator of professionalization. Indeed, MPs are able to dedicate 
more time to their elective mandate, if they receive financial compensation and/or can benefit 
from other material resources to do so (Squire 2007; Z'graggen 2009). Those possible 
interactions will be taken into account in our analysis. 
Firstly, looking at the members of the Federal Assembly, it seems that the occupational 
background sets favorable conditions for a political mandate at the federal level and 
consequently for a political career. MPs need to organize their working time in a flexible 
way. In addition, they should have the financial resources that permit them to pursue a 
political career. This means, they must allow to investing working time into politics without 
direct financial compensations – at least at a lower level of a political career. Ideally, these 
MPs can rely on personal assistants and other staff members. As a consequence, a clear trend 
has been observed concerning the occupational background of the federal MPs in 
Switzerland (Bütikofer 2014; Kerr 1981; Riklin and Möckli 1991). As already mentioned, an 
increasing number of MPs work only in politics related fields (Oesch 2006) and a large share 
of MPs run their own business (self-employed, large employers or farmers). Self-
employment helps MPs in order to be more independent and thus to spend working time for 
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their parliamentary work. Next to these MPs working independently, a considerable share 
belongs to the category of the so-called socio-cultural professionals; that are employed 
lawyers, university or high school professors, medical doctors, nurses and journalists.  
Whilst MPs of this group are less financially independent than self-employed MPs, they are 
able to spend more time for their parliamentary mandate, since they are often part in less 
formalized working structures. Drawing on these observations at the federal level, we 
therefore expect cantonal MPs who have a similar background to that of federal MPs to 
invest more time in their mandate, as their resources are favorable for a political career. 
Hence, the following hypotheses are investigated: 
H1a: Self-employed MPs are more professionalized than employed MPs. 
H1b: MPs who are part of the group of the socio-cultural professionals are more professionalized than 
MPs who are part of another group of working logic. 
In this regard, we expect therefore that the political ambition is an important factor for the 
time spent for the mandate. We argue that MPs who want to pursue a political career invest 
more time for politics, because the parliamentary mandate has a higher significance for those 
MPs. The aim for and the consequential investment in a political career necessarily 
somewhat compromises the development of career paths outside politics. Moreover, the MPs 
who want to pursue a political career are also expected to spend more time for their mandate 
to have a higher chance of succeeding in their career. In order to be visible to their party 
colleagues and also to their constituents, they presumably need to invest more time in their 
mandate. However, we expect the effect of the political ambition to be higher for younger 
MPs, since the parliamentary mandate is more important for a political career in an early 
stage of life, while older MPs might have legitimated their career in a different way. A 
proven indicator for political ambition is whether a cantonal MP aspires to run for office at 
the national level.  
H2a: MPs who run for office at the national level are more professionalized than MPs who do not run.  
H2b: Younger MPs who run for office at the national level are more professionalized than older MPs 
who run. 
The professionalization of parliaments and politicians also affects the institutions 
themselves. On the federal level, the Swiss Federal Assembly went through a series of 
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reforms in the 1990s. One of the reforms concerned the system of the parliamentary 
committees (Lüthi 1996, 1997). The former system of ad hoc committees, which were 
constituted on an ad hoc basis when required for specific bills, has been replaced by a system 
of standing legislative committees. This reform contributed to an increased level of 
professionalization not only of the institution of the Swiss Federal Assembly, but of the 
individual MPs, too (Lüthi 1997; Z’graggen 2009). Another ongoing reform concerns the 
system of allowances for national level MPs. The principles ruling the financial 
compensation of MPs changed fundamentally over time. Only a few decades ago, members 
of the Federal Assembly could rely on small allowances that aimed at covering their travel 
and accommodation expenses in the capital during the parliamentary sessions. Over time, 
the Federal Assembly decided within several reforms to raise these allowances (Hasler 1998). 
Nowadays, Swiss national MPs receive various financial compensations, corresponding both 
to expenses and to remuneration for their work (Vatter 2014; Bütikofer 2015). It has often 
been claimed that the individual professionalization of national MPs is related to the more 
attractive financial conditions associated with the mandate.  
At the cantonal level, the allowances are not comparable with those on the national level. 
While the cantonal parliaments also have undergone reforms and some of the parliaments 
have introduced systems of annual remuneration, the financial compensation differs widely 
between the cantons (Lienhard et al. 2011). However, it is interesting to see whether the level 
of professionalization of cantonal MPs stands in relation with the allowances provided by 
the different cantonal parliaments. We expect the amount of time dedicated by cantonal MPs 
to their legislative mandate to be related to the level of their allowances. 
H3: MPs from cantons with higher allowances for cantonal legislators are more professionalized than 
MPs from cantons with lower allowances.  
Finally, we will also consider differences between linguistic regions. The linguistic cleavage 
is one of the best-documented political differences in Switzerland. The German and the Latin 
parts of the country differ from one another in terms of cultural values and institutional 
structures (Vatter 2002). Among these differences, one, which has frequently been 
highlighted, relates to the conception of the role of the state. Citizens in the Latin part of 
Switzerland tend to have more positive attitudes towards the welfare state. In the German-
speaking regions, by contrast, the principles of subsidiarity and self-organization are 
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considered to be more important (Knüsel 1994). Those different perceptions of the role of the 
state are also reflected in the importance given to different channels of participation and 
representation (Bornschier 2015). Elections and representative democracy are central in the 
Latin cantons. Direct democracy and the direct involvement of citizens in the political 
process are by contrast given more importance in the German part of Switzerland 
(Bühlmann et al. 2013). We expect such differences in the relative importance of 
representative democracy to be reflected in the degree of engagement of MPs.  
H4: MPs from cantons in the Latin linguistic part of Switzerland are more professionalized than MPs 
from the German-speaking cantons.  
 
3 Data and Methods 
The following analysis is mainly based on data gathered from an online-survey that was 
conducted in 2014 (Eberli et al. 2014). All the members of the 26 cantonal parliaments were 
asked to participate in this survey2. Among questions concerning other topics, questions 
concerning the parliamentary work and the individual characteristics of the MPs were 
included. The following analysis is based on those questions and focuses on the cantonal 
parliaments.  
In total, 56.2% or 1'458 out of 2'596 cantonal MPs responded to the survey3. This response 
rate is higher than response rates of other, recent surveys with Swiss cantonal MPs. These 
surveys reached response rates of 21.8% (Brun and Siegel 2006: 486), 51.4% (Feh Widmer 
2015: 183), and 39.5% (Strebel 2014: 129), but these rates can only be compared with 
reservations, since these surveys have covered selected cantons or selected MPs. A response 
rate of 56.2% can likewise be considered as comparatively high for elite surveys with MPs on 
an international comparison (Bailer 2014; Maestas et al. 2003). 
As mentioned above, we define the dependent variable as the amount of time a MP 
dedicates to his or her mandate. More specifically, the MPs were asked to indicate the 
amount of time spent for their mandate over the last year in percentage of a full-time 
                                                            
2  The members of the Federal Assembly were likewise asked to participate. For an overview of first results from 
the survey see Eberli et al. (2014: 5ff.). For detailed information about the survey see Bundi et al. (2014). 
3  Including the Federal Assembly total 55.3% responded to the survey. 
 10 
employment. In the analysis, we test the hypotheses concerning the occupational 
background and the candidacy of the national elections. We also include several other 
control variables on the individual level in our model. Previous research show that female 
MPs at the federal level in Switzerland tend to invest more time for the parliamentary office 
than male MPs (Bütikofer 2014). Moreover, the typical career path of future politicians is that 
they graduate from university and start working in politics or related fields such as think 
thanks, associations, trade unions, communication or campaigning agencies. MPs usually 
have a higher level of formal education than the country average (Pilotti et al. 2010). 
Therefore, the education level of individual MPs is another factor to be taken into account. 
The dependent and all the independent variables on the individual level are gathered from 
the survey besides the variable for the candidacy for the elections of the Swiss National 
Council4. In addition, variables on the level of the parliaments are included in the model. We 
analyze the impact of the linguistic region, the allowances of cantonal MPs per hour of 
session, and as control variables the size of the cantonal parliament and the competitiveness 
in the national elections in the respective canton, i.e. the number of candidates per seat 
available in the National Council. Due to the sample size of 26 cantons, the partly high 
correlations of the variables and the data quality, it seemed most feasible to focus only on 
these four variables on the level of the parliaments. These variables have been drawn from 
diverse sources (Badac 2008; Jaun 2011). A list of all the variables can be found in the 
Appendix.  
The data is analyzed by employing a multi-level model. This seems suitable, on the one hand, 
since the data has a hierarchical structure with MPs nested in parliaments. It can be expected 
that the amount of time spent for the mandate varies strongly between the cantonal 
parliaments, as previous examinations of the cantonal parliaments concerning other 
characteristics such as session length or allowances suggests (e.g. Bochsler et al. 2004). On the 
other hand, for the purpose of our analysis variables both on the level of the individual MP 
and the parliament need to be included in the model. Therefore, a random effects instead of a 
fixed effects model is preferred. However, the random effects model is controversially 
discussed due to its assumption of conditional independence between the covariates and 
                                                            
4  The names of the candidates are publicly available: https://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/nrw15/list/kt_index.html 
(13.01.2016). 
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group-specific components (Bell and Jones 2015). Put simply, the random-effects model 
assumes that the effects within a parliament and between parliaments are equal. This might 
not be the case. E.g. education might have a negative within-effect, as an individual MP 
works more efficiently and invests less time for the mandate the higher the educational 
degree, but it might have a positive between-effect, as parliaments with highly educated MPs 
on average might have a higher workload. In order to relax this assumption, a within-
between random effects model will be applied. This model separates the effects within (!!) 
and between groups (!!); i.e. parliaments:  !!" = !! + !! !!" − !! + !!!! (1) 
 
4 Findings 
The descriptive analysis shows that the MPs of the cantonal parliaments invest a 
substantially different amount of time resources for politics. Figure 1 illustrates the 
distribution of legislative professionalization across the Swiss cantons. In doing so, the figure 
shows that MPs not only spend a different amount of time for their parliamentary mandate 
across the cantonal parliaments, but also within the same parliament. However, while MPs 
in the smaller cantons of Glarus and Appenzell Inner Rhodes dedicate about 7% of their time 
for their mandate, the MPs of Zurich, Vaud and particularly Geneva invest more than 30% 
for their political profession, which is a considerably higher amount of time. According to 
Sciarini (2003), the parliament of Geneva is characterized by a particularly high number of 
sessions. Moreover, the average time varies surprisingly also within a parliament. In 
particular in Geneva, the invested time ranges between 30% and 50%. In addition, 
parliaments often contain to some extent outliers, which invest substantially more time than 
their colleagues from the same parliament – be it due to the fact they have the possibility to 
invest more time or because they have to spend more time, since they hold special positions 
with the parliament. For example in Thurgovia, the average MP spends 15% for the 
parliamentary work, but some MPs dedicate 40% or even 70% of their time for the same 
political mandate. 
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Figure 1: Legislative Professionalization across the Swiss Cantons (n=1377) 
 
 
The differences in working time dedicated to the parliamentary mandate exist not only 
between the various regions in Switzerland, but also between the bigger and smaller cantons. 
Figure 2 shows that the MPs from the French and Italian part of Switzerland dedicate more 
time than the parliaments with a German majority. In the center and east of Switzerland, the 
MPs invest less than one day of their week in their parliamentary mandate, with the 
exceptions of the cantons of Zurich and Bern. In contrast, in the western part of Switzerland, 
the MPs invest often substantially more than 20% of their time for politics. The MPs of 
Geneva spend almost 40% of their time for their mandate, but this number is still smaller 
than at the federal level. However, cantonal MPs need to be prepared to invest between 5% 
and 40% of the time for their mandate, which is a substantial amount of time. In average, a 
cantonal MP spends around 21% of a full time job for politics. 
 13 
Figure 2: Working time dedicated to the parliamentary mandate across Swiss Cantons (Percentage 
of a Full-Time Job) 
 
 
 
The results for the within-between random effects models in the empirical analysis are 
illustrated in Table 1. Focusing on the effects within parliaments, firstly, no significant 
differences for the self-employed are found. In contrast, the respondents belonging to the 
group of socio-cultural specialists invest significantly less time in their mandate than their 
counterparts. The coefficient of the within-variable for socio-cultural specialists shows that 
they invest 1.5 percentage points less in their mandate. Put differently, everything else equal, 
socio-cultural specialists invest 19.4 percentage, while other respondents invest 20.9 
percentage of a full-time employment5. Secondly, Table 1 indicates a significant positive 
effect for candidates within parliaments. This effect diminishes over age – but only in the 
candidate-specific and not in the full model. These effects concerning candidacy remain 
unchanged, if a model is estimated that excludes cantons with only one seat in the National 
Council6. An illustration of the effects in the candidate model further provides Figure 3. With 
respect to a full-time employment, the figure shows that a twenty-year-old candidate invests 
7.5 percentage points more time than a non-candidate of his or her age. In percentage of a 
full-time employment, the responding candidates of 45 years invest 4.7 percentage points 
                                                            
5  Based on model Occupational Background. For modeling interaction terms and marginal effects in within-
between random effects models see Schunck (2013).  
6  6 cantons have one seat. 
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more in their mandate than non-candidates of the same age. While 4.7 per cent of a full-time 
employment is equal to about two hours per week7, this effect is considerable, as the survey 
showed that on average the respondents invest twenty percent of a full-time employment in 
total, which corresponds to less than eight and a half hours per week. Confidence intervals 
included, the effect for candidates is greater than zero until the age of 68 years. Thirdly, 
concerning the variables on the parliament-level, Table 1 shows a positive significant 
relationship with the allowances per hours of session. Furthermore, with exception of the full 
Table 1: Results from the within-between random effects model 
  Basic 
Occupational 
background Candidate Full Model 
Constant -0.1677 (-0.96) -0.1394 (-0.99) -0.1482 (-0.61) -0.1873 (-0.93) 
Within 
        Female 0.0367*** (7.03) 0.0366*** (7.12) 0.0367*** (7.06) 0.0365*** (7.12) 
Education  -0.0022* (-2.15) -0.0010 (-0.93) -0.0023* (-2.21) -0.0011 (-1.01) 
Age  0.0009*** (3.53) 0.0007** (2.75) 0.0013*** (4.51) 0.0011*** (3.76) 
Self-employed 
  
0.0058 (1.07) 
  
0.0048 (0.90) 
Socio-cultural 
  
-0.0154* (-2.07) 
  
-0.0153* (-2.06) 
Candidate NC 
    
0.0733** (2.58) 0.0674* (2.41) 
Age x Candidate 
    
-0.0011* (-1.99) -0.0010 (-1.83) 
Between 
        Female 0.3083*** (3.89) 0.1883* (2.28) 0.3130*** (3.93) 0.1957* (2.35) 
Education  0.0530*** (5.39) 0.0600*** (4.24) 0.0560*** (4.75) 0.0522** (3.27) 
Age  -0.0027 (-0.75) -0.0036 (-1.17) -0.0034 (-0.70) -0.0024 (-0.54) 
Self-employed 
  
0.1379 (1.83) 
  
0.1861* (2.12) 
Socio-cultural 
  
-0.1102 (-0.91) 
  
-0.0859 (-0.64) 
Candidate NC 
    
-0.0856 (-0.15) 0.0811 (0.14) 
Age x Candidate 
    
0.0012 (0.10) -0.0030 (-0.25) 
         Salary MP / hour of session 0.0006*** (5.27) 0.0004*** (3.32) 0.0006*** (5.27) 0.0004** (3.29) 
Latin 0.0352** (2.99) 0.0250* (2.16) 0.0328* (2.54) 0.0262 (1.94) 
Size parliament 0.0004* (2.42) 0.0006*** (3.78) 0.0005 (1.89) 0.0006* (2.06) 
Candidates / seat 
    
-0.0003 (-0.29) 0.0013 (1.12) 
         σu 0.0200*** (5.28) 0.0192*** (5.24) 0.0201*** (5.32) 0.0186*** (5.19) 
σe 0.0830*** (49.32) 0.0809*** (48.85) 0.0825*** (49.32) 0.0805*** (48.86) 
         N (parliaments) 1241 (26) 1218 (26) 1241 (26) 1218 (26) 
Log Likelihood 1310.8906 1317.6501 1317.6132 1324.4105 
ρ 0.0550 0.0531 0.0558 0.0508 
Note: coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
model, MPs of cantons fully or partly in the Latin linguistic region spend significantly more 
time than MPs of cantons in German-speaking cantons. A respondent of a German-speaking 
canton invests on average 19.7 per cent of a full-time employment in the mandate, while a 
                                                            
7  The Swiss standard full-time employment is 42 hours. 
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respondent in a canton fully or partly in the Latin linguistic region spends 2.6 percentage 
points more, that is 22.3 per cent of a full-time employment. Regarding the control variables, 
a significant positive relationship is found for female respondents and for age. All else equal, 
female respondents invest 3.7 percentage points of a full-time employment more in their 
mandate8. MPs also invest significantly more time for their mandate in larger parliaments. 
Lastly, the number of candidates running for one seat in a canton has no significant effect. 
This second parliament-level control variable for the competitiveness of the elections is 
included in the candidate and the full model. 
In addition to the within-effects and the variables on the parliament-level, several between-
variables are significant, particularly gender and education. This can be interpreted that the 
more female MPs are represented and the higher the education on average in a parliament, 
the more time MPs spend for their mandate. More importantly, the significant between-
effects are a sign that the share of women or the educational average correlate with unobser- 
Figure 3: Differences for the effect of (non-)candidates over age 
 
 
ved variable(s) on the parliament-level effects are a sign that the share of women or the 
educational average correlate with unobserved variable(s) on the parliament-level, which 
affect professionalization. Nonetheless, the fit of the model is excellent and a multi-level 
                                                            
8 Marginal effects for the linguistic region and gender are based on the full model. 
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approach with separate within- and between-effects seems indeed necessary, as the 
significant between-effects imply9. 
 
5 Discussion 
The preceding analysis provided a first comprehensive account of legislative 
professionalization in the cantons and tested how several individual- or parliament-specific 
factors mentioned in the literature on professionalization are related to the amount of time 
spent for the parliamentary mandate in cantons. Two hypotheses on the individual level 
concerned the MPs' occupational background. As the occupational profile of the national 
MPs suggests, being able to spend time and resources flexibly seems to be a favorable 
condition for a political career in Switzerland (Kerr 1981; Riklin and Möckli 1991; Bütikofer 
2014). On the one hand, we expected that self-employed MPs invest more time in their 
mandate (H1a). However, although 28.9% of the respondents are self-employed10, the analysis 
did not show a significant difference for self-employed respondents, and the hypothesis has 
to be rejected. Being self-employed is possibly rather a selection criterion to even start a 
parliamentary mandate in general and not a criterion for the amount of time spent 
afterwards. On the other hand, we expected that MPs who are so-called socio-cultural 
specialists spend more time for their mandate due to their flexible occupations (H1b). In the 
analysis, it was found that socio-cultural specialists spend significantly less time for their 
mandate than MPs belonging to other groups. This contradicts our hypothesis and can be 
explained by a closer look at the category of the socio-cultural specialists. Occupations such 
as physicians, lawyers or professors are considered as socio-cultural specialists (Oesch 2006). 
These occupations are well represented in the national parliament and probably give the 
flexibility needed. However, other occupations in the same category possibly set less 
favorable conditions. A good example is the high-school teachers11, which are socio-cultural 
specialists and well represented on the cantonal, but not on the national level. Consequently, 
                                                            
9  Wald-Tests to test whether the between-effects equal 0 can all be rejected. 
10  Overall, about 8% of the permanent residents in Switzerland are self-employed. 
 http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/03/02/blank/key/erwerbstaetige0/nach_erwerbsstatus.ht
ml (13.01.2016) 
11  In the dataset, 26.67% of all socio-cultural specialists are teachers in the Cantonal parliament, while 15.38% of 
all socio-cultural specialists are teachers in the Federal Assembly. 
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although the effect of the socio-cultural specialists is comparatively small in size with 1.5 
percentage points, it might be decisive as such occupations constrain the time spent for the 
mandate already on the cantonal level and then hinder a political career on the national level.  
Another two hypotheses on individual factors concerned the political ambitions of the MPs. 
To consider the parliamentary mandate as a profession does not only mean to be 
continuously and adequately remunerated, but also to have the possibility to stay in the 
"profession" and to pursue a career in it (Z'graggen 2009). Therefore, we hypothesized that 
MPs who want to run for office at the national level invest more time in their mandate than 
non-candidates (H2a). Among the candidates, we expected this effect to be stronger for 
younger candidates, as their occupational career is less developed (H2b). The analysis 
supports these hypotheses. Even if it is controlled for the number of candidates running for 
one seat and thus the electoral competitiveness in a canton, candidates for the elections of the 
National Council in 2015 significantly invest more time in their mandate, whereas the effect 
is larger for the younger than the older candidates. This latter effect was, however, only 
significant in the candidate-specific and not in the full model. These findings thus take up 
the recent work on career paths of MPs, in which one of the groups of MPs is classified as the 
"young ambitious". This group of MPs distinguishes itself by an early start of the political 
career and by a very high – and possibly time-consuming – commitment to both their party 
and political mandate (Bailer et al. 2013). 
Concerning parliament-specific factors, we focused on the allowances and the linguistic 
region as two key variables. Firstly, we hypothesized that the MPs invest the more time in 
their mandate, the higher they are remunerated (H3). This hypothesis is supported, as a 
significant, but relatively small effect for the allowances for the MPs per hours of session and 
the time spent for the mandate was found in all the models. Rosenthal (1996) argues that 
higher compensation attracts more ambitious MPs who devote more time to the mandate. 
However, the study of Lienhard et al. (2011, 115) indicates that the legislative salaries have 
only a limited influence on the legislative professionalization in Switzerland. According to 
the authors, the legislative salaries were only cautiously increased in the Swiss cantons due 
to the restrictions of direct democracy. In contrast, the MPs’ devoted time has increased 
significantly (Kerr, 1981; Riklin and Möckli 1991; Bütikofer 2014). Therefore, we conclude 
that the compensation for the MPs has only a limited influence on legislative 
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professionalization in Switzerland. Secondly, we expected that the MPs in cantonal 
parliaments fully or partly in the Latin linguistic region invest significantly more time than 
their counterparts in the German linguistic region. As suggested in the descriptive analysis 
(see Figure 2), the empirical analysis largely supported this hypothesis. In line with the 
hypothesis, this finding can be interpreted to capture the different understanding of 
representation and roles in the Latin vis-à-vis to the German-speaking part of Switzerland 
(Bühlmann et al. 2013).  
The analysis further shows stable effects of the age, which is significantly positively related 
to the amount spent for the mandate in every model. This effect might be explained, as the 
age correlates with the experience, and more experienced MPs were previously found to 
invest more time in their mandate (Bütikofer 2014). However, estimating different models 
with the variables of age and experience suggested that the explanatory power of age is 
higher, since experience was not significantly related to the professionalization in most of the 
models. 
The analysis also showed that showed that female respondents invest considerably more 
time in their mandate than male respondents and thus confirmed previous work (Bütikofer 
2014). This finding can be interpreted based on previous work on gender and representation 
by Fox and Lawless (2011) They found that women have a significantly lower self-
assessment of their political skills. This would imply that women spend more time for their 
mandate, as in their perception, they might feel the need to invest more in order to 
competently fulfil their mandate. Such an interpretation would mean to even reinforce the 
underrepresentation of females, as diverse, recent studies come to the conclusion that despite 
all efforts, women still have more difficulties in combining family life with careers in the job 
and in politics. For example, Silbermann (2015) stated that the work-life-balance and, as a 
part of thereof, the combination of family and work contribute to gender differences. Feh 
Widmer (2015) likewise for the Swiss case found that men more often re-run for office and 
women stay less long in the cantonal parliaments. Concerning the Swiss local level Plüss and 
Rusch (2012) state that female MPs resign as they seem often not to have the necessary 
personal and allowances for their political work.  
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6 Conclusion 
MPs in the Swiss Cantons spend a different amount of time for their parliamentary mandate. 
To the best of our knowledge, this analysis is the first study that analyzes this aspect of MPs’ 
characteristics and career decisions at the subnational level in Switzerland. This article 
studied the effect of individual and institutional characteristics on the MPs’ 
professionalization. The analysis shows that the amount of time that MPs dedicate to their 
mandate varies highly between MPs, albeit cantonal legislatives still have the characteristics 
of militia parliaments. The findings of our multi-level analysis suggest that the occupational 
background is less important than the MPs’ career ambition: MPs who run for office at the 
national level are more professionalized than their colleagues who do not want to enter the 
national legislative. This effect is even more pronounced for younger MPs. Moreover, female 
MPs are more professionalized as well as MPs in cantons with higher parliamentary 
allowances.  
Some limitations of the study have to be discussed. In literature, professionalization is often 
described as the transformation in the individual behaviour of an MP or in the attributes of 
the institutions (Squire 1992). Since we cannot show the dynamics of potential developments 
over time at the cantonal level due to a lack of data from earlier surveys, we focus on the 
situation in 2014 when the survey was conducted. Second, different methodological issues 
may be present in elite studies, such as legislative surveys. A central problem is often self-
selection of the participants, which might question the representativeness of the survey 
(Bundi et al. 2016). This problem seems to be less pronounced, as the response rate of the 
survey is considerably high: almost six out of ten legislators at the cantonal level answered 
our questions (56.2%). Moreover, the distribution of the respondents’ characteristics (e.g. 
party membership, age, language) is similar to that among all invited legislators (Bundi et al. 
2014). Third, our measure of professionalization, based only on the amount of time that is 
spent to fulfill the parliamentary mandate on the individual level, may be seen as imperfect. 
Borchert (2003) argues that legislative professionalization also takes place at the level of 
offices, institutions, and the political system as such. Consequently, several studies have 
included more factors in order to measure professionalization (Squire 1992, 2007). However, 
building an index in order to measure legislative professionalization has recently been 
criticized in literature (Bowen and Greene 2014). In doing so, we take the tradition up of 
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studies on legislative professionalization in Switzerland (Kerr 1981; Riklin and Möckli 1991; 
Wiesli and Linder 2000; Krüger et al. 2001; Hug et al. 2008). Moreover, since many factors as 
personal staff or offices are inexistent in the cantons, reducing professionalization to the 
dedicated time is reasonable in that context. Due to the fact that slightly more women have 
participated in the survey and that female legislators tend to invest more time to their 
mandate in average, the professionalization might have been be slightly overestimated in the 
survey. 
MPs move in mysterious ways. Recent works on legislative careers have tried to understand 
why MPs run for office (Bailer et al. 2013; Borchert 2011; Fox and Lawless 2011; Hall and Van 
Houwelling 1995). We have taken another path in order to understand MPs’ decision. Our 
study suggests that more ambitious MPs invest more time for their parliamentary mandate. 
The implication of this is not only that legislative ambitions are already observable in early 
stage of a MP’s career, but also that subnational MPs take an important role for political 
careers. Usually, MPs seek to move from the subnational up to the national level (Høyland et 
al. 2013; Bailer et al. 2013; Bailer 2016). If MPs withdraw from the parliamentary mandate 
due to their insufficient motivation to invest more time, only MPs with enough time 
resources will continue to pursue a political career. As a consequence, MPs at the national 
level will be more professionalized.  
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Appendix 
Table A 1: Description of the variables 
Dependent Variable: Individual Level 
Variable Operationalization Remark(s) / Source 
Professionalization amount of time dedicated to the parliamentary 
mandate in percentage of a full-time 
employment, [0, 1], N=1377, mean=0.21 
 
Independent Variables: Individual Level 
Variable Operationalization Remark(s) / Source 
Female 1 = female (435, 29.84%) 
0 = male (1023, 70.16%) 
 
Education highest educational degree, treated as 
continuous variable, [1, 8], N=1378, mean = 
5.48 
 
Age Age in years (2014), [21, 83], N=1458, mean= 
51.51 
 
Self-employed 1 = self-employed (373, 28.85%) 
0 = not self-employed (920, 71.15%) 
based on Oesch (2006), MPs indicating 
their occupation as "politician", "mayor", 
etc. were excluded (N=60) Socio 1 = socio-cultural professionals (165, 12.50%) 
0 = other categories (1155, 87.50%)  
Candidate NC 1 = candidate for the elections of the National 
Council in 2015 (341, 23.39%) 
0 = no candidate for the elections of the 
National Council in 2015 (1117, 76.61%) 
Schweizerische Bundeskanzlei,  
https://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/nrw15/l
ist/kt_index.html 
Note that the individual-level variables have been decomposed in two parts: (1) The between variable, which 
reflects the parliamentary-specific mean of the variable. (2) The within variable, which reflects the individual 
deviation of the parliamentary-specific mean. 
   
Parliamentary Level Only 
Variable Operationalization Remark(s) / Source 
Latin 0 = German (17, 65.38%) 
1 = German and Latin language(s) or only 
Latin language (9, 34.62%) 
 
Size Parliament Number of seats in the parliament, [49, 180], 
N=26, mean=100 
 
Salary MP per hour 
of session 
Salary per MP in Fr. per hour of session, [45.55, 
263.72], N=26, mean= 115.96 
Jaun (2011) 
Candidates per Seat No of (official) Candidates per seat per Canton 
in the elections for the National Council in 
2015, [2, 24.94], N=26, mean = 14.10 
Federal Chancellery, 
https://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/nrw15/l
ist/kt_index.html 
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Table A 2: Overview of legislative professionalization in the Swiss cantons 
Canton Ø (Time spent in 
Percentage of a Full-
Time Employment) 
Size of Parliament Salary per MP in CHF Candidates per seat in 
the elections for 
National Council 2015 
ZH 30.95% 180 22’538 24.94 
BE 27.89% 160 17’061 22.68 
LU 22.66% 120 10’195 15.90 
UR 13.25% 64 4’425 3.00 
SZ 13.12% 100 5’241 12.50 
OW 13.75% 55 4’155 2.00 
NW 16.09% 60 5’811 2.00 
GL 7.97% 60 2’900 2.00 
ZG 19.92% 80 9’801 16.67 
FR 21.04% 110 10’162 18.71 
SO 17.32% 100 8’900 24.50 
BS 22.75% 100 15’294 24.40 
BL 24.27% 90 14’413 16.00 
SH 14.47% 60 6’682 10.50 
AR 13.17% 65 4’574 3.00 
AI 7.27% 49 1’481 2.00 
SG 16.02% 120 12’840 16.50 
GR 17.67% 120 14’627 14.00 
AG 19.60% 140 11’597 18.00 
TG 15.62% 130 7’051 20.50 
TI 27.33% 90 25’653 15.25 
VD 31.18% 150 27’125 18.11 
VS 21.16% 130 12’235 21.63 
NE 17.80% 115 5’238 13.50 
GE 37.45% 100 37’448 16.18 
JU 15.44% 60 12’875 12.00 
Mean 19.43% 100 11’935 14.10 
Source: Badac, 2008; Eberli et al., 2014; Jaun, 2011, Federal Chancellery,  
https://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/nrw15/list/kt_index.html 
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